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III. Vertragsschluss
1. Zum Thema Vertragsschluss sind krzlich drei wichtige
Vorentscheide („auto“) des TS ergangen: Mit zwei, am 17.2.
1998 ergangenen Beschlssen zum selben Thema legte der TS
fest, dass ein mehrfacher, gegenseitiger Schriftwechsel zwischen
den Parteien geeignet ist, einen Vertrag abzuschließen
(Arts.18-19 CISG).20 Nicht ausreichend ist dies allerdings, um
den Schluss zu ziehen, dass der Vertrag auch eine Klausel um-
fasst, die jeden Rechtsstreit zwischen den Parteien der Schieds-
gerichtsbarkeit unterstellen wrde. hnliche Anmerkungen
macht sodann der TS in einem weiteren, am 26.5.1998 datier-
ten Vorentscheid.
2. Mit Entscheid vom 28.1.2000 hat der TS in geschickter
Weise beschlossen, dass der Versand einer Fax-Mitteilung, in
welchem eine Vertragspartei um Lieferung der Waren nach-
sucht, die Annahme einer voran gehenden Offerte darstellt.
Der TS hat in der Folge irrtmlicherweise anstelle von Art. 8
CISG die Vertragsauslegungsregeln des innerspanischen Rechts
angewandt.21 Dennoch war das Urteil des TS im Ergebnis rich-
tig: „Mar	n Palomares, S.L.“ hat bei der Firma „Internationale
Jute Maatschappij“ 800.000 Jutetten fr einen Preis von USD
55.90 pro 100 Stck bestellt. Nach Abschluss des Vertrages,
d.h. nach der erfolgten und zugestellten Bestellung, wollte die
Kuferin den Preis nochmals verhandeln, was zu einem Aus-
tausch weiterer Fax-Schreiben zwischen den Parteien fhrte.
Schlussendlich musste die Verkuferin die Tten gnstiger an
einen Dritten verkaufen. Die Verkuferin forderte von der (ur-
sprnglichen) Kuferin Schadenersatz im Umfang des Unter-
schieds zwischen dem mit ihr vertraglichen vereinbarten Preis
und dem Erls des Deckungsverkaufs (Art.75 CISG). Die (ur-
sprngliche) Kuferin argumentierte ihrerseits, dass gar kein
Vertrag zustande gekommen sei, dass sie ihr Akzept gar nie
erklrt, sondern lediglich eine Gegenofferte gemacht habe.
IV. Schlussbemerkungen
1. Vermutlich besteht in Spanien, im Vergleich zu anderen
Vertragsstaaten des Wiener Kaufrechts, nur eine geringe An-
zahl hchstrichterlicher Entscheide, da die Parteien eines in-
ternationalen Kaufvertrages in aller Regel eine Schiedsklausel
ausbedingen und somit kein Urteil publiziert wird.
2. Ein Vergleich der spanischen Rechtsprechung zum UN-
Kaufrecht mit auslndischen Urteilen22 ergibt, dass fr die
meisten Rechtsprobleme hnliche Lsungsanstze gewhlt wor-
den sind. Als abweichend aufgefallen ist lediglich der oben
erwhnte Entscheid der AP Vizcaya vom 5.11.2003.
3. Es kann somit – auch aus spanischer Sicht – festgehalten
werden, dass die nationalen Gerichte bei Auslegungsfragen, die
das CISG betreffen, in der Regel einheitlich entscheiden.
The author is analyzing the legal practice applied by Spanish courts
to international sales of goods contracts (CISG) with a special focus
to the question and possible solutions of conflict of interests. Based
on the rendered judgments it seems that the courts try to decide each
case on its own merits. The Spanish case law dealing with the
international sales of goods seems to be strongly in line with the
jurisprudence of other member states of the Convention. However,
the chosen approach to decide each case on its own merits leads to
some deviating sentences that will be outlined and reviewed in the
following contribution.
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I. Introduction
Art. 39(2) of the Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, CISG, is a key provision of the CISG as
it limits the buyer’s right to rely on the non-conformity of
the goods to two years after the handing over of the goods.
This article states that “[.. .] the buyer loses the right to rely on
a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give the seller noti-
ce thereof at the latest within a period of two years from the date
on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, unless
this time-limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of guaran-
tee”. However, only limited essays1 and cases2 explicitly deal
with this issue; and they mainly focus on the relationship be-
tween Art. 39(2) CISG and domestic limitation periods. The
scarcity of scholarly writings and cases dealing with this arti-
cle can be attributed to several reasons. The main reason,
however, is that Art. 39(1) CISG is the leading cause for the
loss of the buyer’s right to rely on the non-conformity of the
* The author is currently working as an academic assistant to Professor Dr.
Ingeborg Schwenzer, LL.M., at the University of Basel (Switzerland). He
gratefully thanks her for the support and mentoring in the preparation of
this article. The author would also like to thank Francesca Mazza, Coun-
sel at the ICC Court of Arbitration (Paris), for her encouragement to
write this note, and Borzu Sabahi for the long and fruitful discussions at
the Place de la Contrescarpe in the Quartier Latin-Mouffetard.
1 See for example: Weitnauer, Anzeige der Vertragswidrigkeit und Auf-
forderung zur Untersuchung nach Art. 39 Abs. 2 EKG, in: IPRax 1987,
p. 221 et seq.; Janssen, Das Verhltnis nationaler Verjhrungsvorschrif-
ten zur Ausschlussfrist des Art. 39 Abs. 2 CISG in der Schweiz, in:
IPRax 2003, p. 369 et seq.; Will, “Meine Grossmutter in der
Schweiz . . .”: Zum Konflikt von Verjhrung und Rgefrist nach UN-
Kaufrecht, in: Rauscher /Mansel (eds.), Festschrift fr Werner Lorenz
zum 80 Geburtstag, Mnchen 2001, p.623 et seq.
2 E.g.: Bundesgericht (Switzerland), 7 July 2004, CISG-online No. 848;
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart (Germany), 20 December 2004, CISG-on-
line No. 997; Cour d’appel de Lyon (France), 18 December 2003, CISG-
20 P. Perales Viscasillas, La formacin del contrato en la compraventa in-
ternacional de mercader	as, Valencia, 1996, 151 ff.
21 F. Oliva Bla´zquez, „Aceptacin, contraoferta y modificacin del contrato
de compraventa internacional a la luz del art	culo 8 del Convenio de
Viena. La indemnizacin de daos y perjuicios y el ‚deber de mitigar‘ ‚ex‘
art	culo 77 CISG“, RdP 5 / 2000, 203-219; P. Perales Viscasillas, La for-
macin, 494 ff.
22 T. Va´zquez Le´pinette, Compraventa internacional de mercader	as. Una
visin jurisprudencial. Pamplona, 2000, 55 ff., 107 ff.
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goods and, hence, attracts more attention in case law and
academic discussion.3
The question of time limitation under Art. 39(2) CISG only
arises in a few important cases. For example, this article might
gain significance in cases where the period under Art. 39(1)
CISG has not been triggered at all, or where the buyer has a
reasonable excuse under Art. 444 CISG.5
II. Purpose of Art. 39(2) CISG
The purpose of Art. 39(2) CISG is to protect the seller from
claims arising an unreasonably long time after the contract has
been performed.6 In international trade, the need for certainty
and security demands that the seller of goods be assured that
disputes arising out of their delivery be subject to some “cut-off
point” in the future.7 Moreover, the more time passes, the more
difficult it becomes for the seller to have recourse to his sup-
pliers for redress owing to their role in the delivery of the non-
conforming goods in question. Another aspect, namely the
passage of time, makes it more and more difficult for the seller
to prove that the non-conformity may not have existed at the
time the risk passed, e.g. because witnesses may no longer
remember.8
In a sense, this protection is a departure from the character
of the CISG, at least as it is regarded in German speaking
countries, as a generally buyer-friendly convention.9
It is important to note that the function of Art. 39(2) CISG
is not to limit the buyer’s right to commence judicial procee-
dings10 or to set up any rules of prescription.11 This latter limit,
the limitation period, is determined by reference to the Con-
vention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of
Goods,12 if this Convention is applicable, or by the applicable
domestic law. However, in special circumstances, Art. 39(2)
CISG can be used to extend or to interpret the domestic lim-
itation period.13 This is the case, for example, when the domes-
tic limitation period is shorter than two years. The reason for
this is that it would be contradictory to still grant the buyer the
right to give notice of, and to rely on, any non-conformity of
the goods, but at the same time make such claims time-barred
by the domestic statute of limitations.
III. Beginning of the period
When dealing with a provision setting forth time periods, it is
essential to discuss it in terms of the beginning and the end of
this period. Therefore, this article will first deal with the be-
ginning of the period, both in normal and in exceptional cir-
cumstances, before turning to the end of the period, as well as
other subsequent questions arising under Art. 39(2) CISG, such
as form and content of the notice.
online No. 871; Kantonsgericht Wallis (Switzerland), 30 April 2003,
CISG-online No. 896; Handelsgericht des Kantons Bern (Switzerland),
17 January 2002, CISG-online No. 725; Handelsgericht des Kantons
Bern (Switzerland), 30 October 2001, CISG-online No. 956; Oberlan-
desgericht Graz (Austria), 24 January 2001, CISG-online No. 800;
Landgericht Memmingen (Germany), 13 September 2000, CISG-on-
line No. 820; Gerechtshof Arnhem (Netherlands), 27 April 1999,
CISG-online No. 741.
3 “[Art. 39(2) CISG] is applicable only where the buyer could not have
protested earlier because the lack of conformity did not come to light
before then”, cf. Rechtbank van Koophandel (Belgium), 25 April 2001,
CISG-online No. 765. Also see Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), 19 May
1999, CISG-online No. 484, stating that Art. 39(2) CISG is relevant in
three different situations: First, if the buyer could not examine the goods
at an earlier point in time, second, if the buyer could not discover the
non-conformity, third, if he could not give notice of the non-conformity
at an earlier point in time.
4 Art. 44 CISG states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of article 39 and paragraph
(1) of article 43, the buyer may reduce the price in accordance with Article 50
or claim damages, except for loss of profit, if he has a reasonable excuse for his
failure to give the required notice.
5 See Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), Commentary on
the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Oxford
2005, Art. 39 para. 22. Art. 44 CISG does not apply under Art. 39(2)
CISG, cf. Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), 15 October 1998, CISG-on-
line No. 380.
6 Cf. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods prepared by the Secretariat (“Secretariat
Commentary”), Official Records, UN DOC. A /CONF. 97/5, p. 35 pa-
ra.5, online at: http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/materials-commentary.
html#Article%2038. For cut-off periods in general, see Reitz, AHistory
of Cutoff Rules as a Form of Caveat Emptor: Part I – The 1980 U.N.
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, online at: http://cis-
gw3.
law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/reitz1.html.
7 Cf. UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United Nations Convention
on the International Sale of Goods (UNCITRAL Digest on the CISG),
Art. 39 para. 23, online at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
V04/552/11/PDF/V0455211.pdf?OpenElement.
8 For reasons for limiting the buyer’s right, see Schwenzer, in: Schlech-
triem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit (footnote 5), Art. 38 para. 4.
9 See Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), 27 August 1999, CISG-online
No. 485.
10 See Cour d’appel de Grenoble (France), 13 September 1995, CISG-on-
line No. 157, stating: “Qu’en outre, le dlai prfix de deux ans menti-
onn au 2me alina de cet article ne vise pas une action en justice”. See
also Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980
United Nations Convention, 3rd ed., The Hague 1999, § 261.1.
11 “This provision is distinct from rules on prescription (limitation)”, see
O.R., Doc. A(6), A / CN.9 /WG.2 /WP.16, p. 48, para. 84.
12 Online at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/limit/limit-co
nv.pdf.
13 Cf. Handelsgericht Bern (Switzerland), 30 October 2001, Nr. 8831
FEMA, CISG-online No. 956; Handelsgericht Bern (Switzerland), 17
January 2002, Nr. 8805 FEMA, CISG-online No. 725; Janssen, Das
Verhltnis nationaler Verjhrungsvorschriften zur Ausschlussfrist des
Art. 39 Abs. 2 CISG in der Schweiz, in: IPRax 2003, p. 369 et seq.;
Tann, Die Berechnung der Rgefrist im schweizerischen, deutschen
und UN-Kaufrecht, Dissertation, St. Gallen 1993, p. 288. Criticizing the
coincidence of the “cut-off” period under Art. 39(2) CISG and the
limitation period under domestic law by simply extending or interpre-
ting the limitation period, Will suggests that the short domestic limi-
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1. In normal circumstances
As has already been said, Art. 39(2) CISG states that ‘‘the buyer
loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does
not give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two
years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to
the buyer’’. It can be inferred from the plain wording of this
provision that neither delivery under Art. 31 CISG14 et seq. nor
the passing of risk can trigger the commencement of the lim-
itation period. In neither such case would the true objective of
the deal be achieved, i.e. the buyer who is interested in receiv-
ing the goods does not have them in his physical possession.
Thus, the goods have to have been physically handed over.15
Moreover, the handing over of documents representing the
goods that entitle the buyer to resell or to collect the goods
cannot be sufficient either. In international trade, especially
where commodities are concerned, such documents can be
resold16 several times while the goods are still in transit17 or
storage before the last buyer actually takes them over.18 Relying
on the physical handing over of the goods rather than the
documents makes goods sense; it is what the parties ultimately
intended.
Therefore, when the goods are directly delivered to one of
the buyer’s customers, the handing over of the goods to that
customer constitutes the relevant point in time at which the
period under Art. 39(2) CISG is triggered.19
2. If the goods are never actually handed over
In some exceptional cases, however, the goods are never actu-
ally handed over to the buyer. This could occur, for example, if the
goods perish due to their lack of conformity before they can be
handed over.20 Alternately, the goods may be seized or even
destroyed by authorities due to the non-conformity,21 such as
where the goods are contaminated or not in compliance with
national safety standards. The fact that the goods are never
actually handed over to the buyer could also occur, if the buyer
refuses to take delivery in accordance with Art. 60(b) CISG,
i.e. refuses the tender.
Art. 39(2) CISG does not explicitly deal with these situa-
tions. Therefore, we have to solve this problem in conformity
with the general principles underlying the CISG.
a) Destruction of the goods
According to Art. 7(2) CISG, ‘‘questions concerning matters gov-
erned by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to
be solved in conformity with the general principles on which it is
based’’. The purpose of and, therefore, the principle underlying
Art. 39(2) CISG is to protect the seller from claims arising an
unreasonably long time after the contract has been performed.22
Hence, the conclusion that the limitation period under
Art. 39(2) CISG never starts to run if the goods are not phy-
sically handed over would be contrary to this principle of the
Convention.
However, if the goods are destroyed or perish before they can
actually be handed over to the party intended, be it the buyer
or the buyer’s customer, several points of time for triggering the
commencement of the two years period are conceivable:
One possibility would be to consider the point at which the
buyer becomes aware of the destruction as the relevant point in
time. Especially where the goods are in transit for a consider-
able amount of time, such as by ship, in light of modern tele-
communication, awareness of destruction could be gained sev-
eral months prior to when the goods – hypothetically – would
have been handed over. Here, however, two different kinds of
knowledge must be distinguished: First, the knowledge of de-
tation periods should either only start to run after a notice of non-
conformity was given within the meaning of Art. 39 CISG, or that the
buyer should be granted a “reasonable time” after he gave notice to
assert his remedies. See Will, “Meine Grossmutter in der Schweiz.. .”:
Zum Konflikt von Verjhrung und Rgefrist nach UN-Kaufrecht, in:
Rauscher /Mansel (eds.), Festschrift fr Werner Lorenz zum 80. Ge-
burtstag, pp.623-642, p.640 et seq. Also following the “reasonable
time” approach, see Piltz, Internationales Kaufrecht, Mnchen 1993,
§ 5 para. 90.
14 Article 31 CISG states:
If the seller is not bound to deliver the goods at any other particular place, his
obligation to deliver consists:
(a) if the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods – in handing the goods
over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer;
(b) if, in cases not within the preceding subparagraph, the contract related to
specific goods, or unidentified goods to be drawn from a specific stock or to be
manufactured or produced, and at the time of the conclusion of the contract
the parties knew that the goods were at, or were to be manufactured or
produced at, a particular place – in placing the goods at the buyer’s disposal
at that place;
(c) in other cases – in placing the goods at the buyer’s disposal at the place
where the seller had his place of business at the time of the conclusion of the
contract.
15 Cf. Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit (footnote
5), Art. 39 para. 24; O.R., Doc. C(4), A /CONF.97 / C.1 / SR.1, p. 349,
paras. 59-65. Pursuant to Art. 60(b) CISG, the buyer has an obligation
to physically take over the goods. Cf. Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem /
Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit (footnote 5), Art. 60 para. 2a.
16 This can be carried out by selling the document of title, such as bill of
lading, representing the goods. These sales are still governed by the
CISG. The Secretariat Commentary, op. cit. (footnote 6), p.16 para. 8,
online at: http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/materials-commentary.html#
Article%202, explicitly states: “[Art. 2(d) CISG] does not exclude doc-
umentary sales of goods from the scope of this Convention even though,
in some legal systems, such sales may be characterized as sales of com-
mercial paper”.
17 So called sale in transit, see Ramberg, International Commercial Trans-
actions, 3rd ed. Stockholm 2004, p. 42.
18 Cf. Mullis, Avoidance for Breach under the Vienna Convention; A
Critical Analysis of some of the Early Cases, in: Andreas [&] Jarborg
(eds.), Anglo-Swedish Studies in Law, Lustus Forlag (1998), p. 329 et seq.
19 See Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit (footnote
5), Art. 39 para. 24; O.R., Doc. C(4), A /CONF.97 / C.1 / SR.1, p. 349,
para.57, 58; Kuoppala, Examination of the Goods under the CISG and
the Finnish Sale of Goods Act, Turku 2000, para. 4.5.2., online at:
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kuoppala.html#iv.
20 In such cases, Art. 39 CISG only applies where the risk has already
passed under Arts 67 to 69 CISG or according to certain terms of the
contract, e.g. if the parties agreed on “FOB” or another clause of the
INCOTERMS where, under their clauses A5 and B5 governing the
passing of risk, the risk has already passed at this point. In cases where
the risk has not passed, such a situation would result in a non-delivery.
21 See for example Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), 2 March 2005, CISG-
online No. 999.
22 See supra.
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struction due to the non-conformity; and second, the knowledge of
the destruction per se.23
In the first scenario, reliance on the buyer’s knowledge could
lead to the unequal treatment of similar situations and would,
therefore, not create legal certainty. In situations where it is
obvious, or at least easy, to discover that the destruction was due
to the non-conformity of the goods and not to a carrier’s breach
of contract, the period under Art. 39(2) CISG would be trig-
gered instantly. This result would be in accordance with the
Convention’s policy of protecting the seller. However, in situa-
tions where it is hard to establish the cause of the destruction or
perishment, the period under Art. 39(2) CISG would only be
triggered a considerable time after the hypothetical point of
handing over of the goods. In extreme cases this could occur
after more than two years, such as where expert’s statements are
necessary to find out whether it was the packaging of the
goods,24 another non-conformity, merely the inappropriate tran-
sportation, or other reasons25 that caused the destruction.26 This
result would clearly be against the article’s principle of pro-
tecting the seller. More importantly, this approach would result
in the periods under Art. 39(1) CISG and Art. 39(2) CISG
being triggered simultaneously, thus rendering Art. 39(2) CISG
superfluous. Hence, when relying on the knowledge of the
destruction as the relevant point in time, only the knowledge
of the destruction per se could be appropriate to trigger the period
under Art. 39(2) CISG.
In both scenarios, a general argument against determining
the period of time as commencing with knowledge, be it per se or
also of the cause for destruction, is that Art. 39(2) CISG clearly
differentiates between any knowledge, including hypothetical
knowledge,27 which triggers the period under Art. 39(1) CISG,
and the beginning of the period under Art. 39(2) CISG, which
is triggered by handing over the goods.
As an alternative to relying on knowledge, the time of the
hypothetical handing over could also be relied upon to trigger the
time period under Art. 39(2) CISG.
Here, the main critique might be that the goods are never
actually handed over and, hence, according to the strict word-
ing of Art. 39(2) CISG, this period never begins to run. But, as
has already been said, this result would be against the principle
of seller protection under this very article. Therefore, we have
to look for other alternatives. It is submitted that a hypothe-
tical point in time for handing over should trigger the period.
This solution comes closest to the time frame that the “fathers”
of the Convention intended to apply, as both in the case of
actual handing over as well as in the case of hypothetical
handing over, the same dates become relevant. Moreover, this
point of time is the most objective and is not subject to as many
external coincidences as the point in time of knowledge of the
destruction would be – such as whether the carrier has a mobile
phone –, and would, therefore, only vary by few days.28 Most
importantly, this interpretation departs only marginally from
the plain wording of Art. 39(2) CISG.
In conclusion, there are more factors favouring the hypo-
thetical approach. Therefore, in cases where the goods are
never actually handed over because of the destruction of the
goods and Art. 39 CISG is applicable, the period of time under
Art. 39(2) CISG should be triggered by the date of the hypo-
thetical handing over of the goods, which can be easily con-
strued from the usual duration of the agreed transportation or
even from the planned or agreed date for handing over.
b) Buyer’s refusal to take over the goods
Yet another interesting situation in which the goods are never
actually handed over arises where the buyer refuses to take over
the goods or rejects any documents, i.e. refuses the tender.29
Here, as the buyer at least believes he has bona fide reasons
for refusing the goods or documents, the period under
Art. 39(1) CISG is thereby simultaneously triggered and the
question of the period under Art. 39(2) CISG becomes less
important. However, if Art. 39(2) CISG was indeed to become
relevant,30 the same question of whether and when this two
years period is triggered has to be answered.
Art. 10(2) of the Convention on the Limitation Period in the
International Sale of Goods provides a possible solution. This
Convention was intended to be a sister convention31 to the CISG
and, therefore, may be consulted as a persuasive authority here.
This article states that “a claim arising from a defect or other lack of
conformity shall accrue on the date on which the goods are actually
handed over to, or their tender is refused by, the buyer“. Thus,
Art. 10(2) of the Limitation Convention does indeed equate the
situation where the goods are handed over to the buyer with the
situation where the buyer refuses the tender. The wording of this
article, i.e. “actually handed over“, as well as the interpretation32
of that expression – actual handing over means physical handing
over – are identical to those under the CISG.
Therefore, it is submitted that “refusal of the tender” should
also be equated with “actual handing over” under Art. 39(2)
CISG and that the buyer’s refusal to take over the goods or docu-
ments should trigger the commencement of the period.
23 Destruction per se means that the buyer knows that the goods have been
destroyed, but does not know the exact reason for the destruction.
24 The insufficient packaging of the goods can also amount to a non-
conformity of the goods. Cf. Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer
(eds.), op. cit. (footnote 5), Art. 35 para.11.
25 An example of such other reasons, which one could also subsume under
inappropriate transportation, is rough cargo handling. See Ramberg,
op. cit. (footnote 17), p.60.
26 Sometimes both parties are negligent in finding out the exact reason for
the destruction, as they usually take out insurance, with the conse-
quence that it is the insurance company facing the detriment. In prac-
tice, therefore, the ultimate risk allocation is a battle between insurers.
See Ramberg, op. cit. (footnote 17), p.63. The insured, however, may
be liable for a breach of its duty under the insurance contract for
negligence.
27 The period of time under Art. 39(1) CISG begins to run after the buyer
has discovered the non-conformity or ought to have discovered it.
28 In cases where the parties have agreed on a certain date, there would
not be any uncertainty at all.
29 For a thorough discussion of the buyer’s right to refuse to take delivery
of non-conforming goods under the CISG, see Schlechtriem, Inter-
pretation, gap-filling and further development of the UN Sales Con-
vention, online at: http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/Schlechtriem-e.pdf.
30 In the author’s imagination this can only be the case where the buyer
has a reasonable excuse to give notice of non-conformity under Art. 44
CISG and only gave reasons for his refusal to take over the goods or
documents towards the carrier.
31 See Kazuaki Sono, The Limitation Convention: The Forerunner to
Establish UNCITRAL Credibility, I., online at: http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sono3.html#i.
32 See Official Commentary to this Convention, Art. 10, online at: http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1979-e/vol10-p145-173-e.pdf;
Mller-Chen, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit. (footnote
5), Art. 10 of the Limitation Convention, para.5.
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What can be said in favour of this approach is that it pro-
tects the seller while not discriminating the buyer. The seller is
protected by limiting the buyer’s right to rely on any non-con-
formity of the goods to two years after the rejection; the buyer is
not discriminated as he at least should know the reason for his
rejection and, therefore, should be able to give notice of non-
conformity within the following two years. In addition to that,
this approach is independent from the question whether the
buyer, when rejecting the goods,33 has to take them in posses-
sion on behalf of the seller in accordance with Art. 86(2) CISG
in order to preserve them and “physical handing over” in some
sense takes place in the end.
IV. End of the period
Having dealt with the beginning of the period, this article will
now turn to its end.
Art. 39(2) CISG does not state when its two-year period
ends, nor does it state how the period should be calculated.
Art. 20(2) CISG, however, deals with the calculation of an-
other period, namely the period for timely acceptance of an
offer. This provision states that “[o]fficial holidays or non-business
days occurring during the period for acceptance are included in
calculating the period. However, if a notice of acceptance cannot
be delivered at the address of the offeror on the last day of the period
because that day falls on an official holiday or a non-business day at
the place of business of the offeror, the period is extended until the
first business day which follows“. As mentioned before, Art. 7(2)
CISG allows reliance on the general principles underlying the
CISG. The principle underlying Art. 20(2) CISG is to include
official holidays etc. in the calculation of a period of acceptan-
ce. It is submitted that the principle underlying Art. 39(2)
CISG is the same. Thus, holidays etc. should also be included
in calculating the period under Art. 39(2) CISG. However, it
should be noted that, when solving other problems, such as
whether two years are considered to be a certain number of
days, i.e. 730 days, or a period from one date in the year the
period commences to the same date two years later,34 the ap-
plicable domestic law is to be consulted.35
One last thing worthy of mention here is that Art. 39 CISG
only requires that thenotice is givenwithin the respectiveperiods.
Pursuant to Art. 27 CISG, the seller bears the transmission risk,
i.e. the risk that the notice is lost on its way to the seller.36
V. Contractual period of guarantee
In line with the general principle of party autonomy underlying
the CISG,37 the time limit of Art. 39(2) CISG is subject to any
other contractual period of guarantee granted by the seller or
stipulated between the parties. It is irrelevant whether the
contracted period actually extends or shortens the two year
period under Art. 39(2) CISG.38
It is important to note that the contractual stipulations have
to be inconsistent with the time limit under Art. 39(2) CISG in
order to have an impact on this article.39 Such a stipulation is
obviously inconsistent with the two-year limit under Art. 39(2)
CISG if the period of the guarantee exceeds two years.40 How-
ever, when the stipulated guarantee period is shorter than the
two years, the contract has to be interpreted in order to clarify
whether this shorter period is, in fact, inconsistent with
Art. 39(2) CISG. For example, when the seller grants the buyer
additional remedies, such as the immediate replacement of
non-conforming parts after a simple complaint is made within
a certain time limit, e.g. 60 days after the buyer takes over the
goods, this period of guarantee is not inconsistent with the
period of Art. 39(2) CISG, as it merely supplements the
buyer’s remedies under the CISG.41
VI. Ex officio character
Another important procedural question is whether the parties42
in legal proceedings have to rely on Art. 39(2) CISG, or not.
When answering this question, again, the purpose of Art. 39(2)
CISG has to be taken into account. When the drafters of the
Convention decided to protect the seller, it was not only the
individual seller, but sellers in general, who were supposed to be
protected. Several representatives held that such a cut-off per-
iod was important, as it was difficult to obtain evidence a long
time after the contract had been performed, and claims more
than two years after the handing over of the goods would be of
doubtful merit.43 Furthermore, other general principles like le-
gal certainty44 were taken into account and the two-year limit
was accepted as a compromise only reached45 after lengthy
discussions. Accordingly, it is not upon the seller in each case
to state that the buyer is precluded from relying on any non-
conformity; rather, the arbitrators or judges have to apply
33 “[The buyer] is not obligated to take possession of the goods under
paragraph (2) [of Art. 86] if before the arrival of the goods he rejects
the shipping documents because they indicate that the goods do not
conform to the contract“. See Secretariat Commentary, op. cit. (foot-
note 6), p.62 para. 4, online at: http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/materi
als-commentary.html#Article%2075, emphasis added by the author.
34 This period could be different because of leap years. Here, holidays etc.
would be automatically included and the result would be in perfect
conformity with the solution provided for by the CISG.
35 Cf. Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit. (footnote
5), Art. 39 para. 25.
36 Art. 27 CISG states:
Unless otherwise expressly provided in this Part of the Convention, if any
notice, request or other communication is given or made by a party in ac-
cordance with this Part and by means appropriate in the circumstances, a
delay or error in the transmission of the communication or its failure to arrive
does not deprive that party of the right to rely on the communication.
37 Art. 6 CISG fundamentally states that ‘‘[t]he parties may exclude the
application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary
the effect of any of its provisions’’.
38 Cf. Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit. (footnote
5), Art. 39 paras. 26, 34, 35.
39 Cf. Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit. (footnote
5), Art. 39 para. 26.
40 See Sono, in: Bianca / Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the International
Sales Law, Milan 1987, p. 311, para. 3.4., online at: http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sono-bb39.html.
41 Cf. Enderlein, in: Enderlein /Maskow / Strohbach, Internationales
Kaufrecht, Berlin 1991, Art. 39 para. 8.
42 In fact, it would be the seller relying on that provision.
43 See O.R., Doc. A(10)(b), A /CN.9/100, annex III, p.100, para.107.
44 At the Diplomatic Conference, Mr. Herber, representative of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, stated that “there was need to have a clear
rule on who bore the risk of undiscovered non-conformity”. See O.R.,
Doc. C(4), A / CONF.97 / C.1 / SR.1, p. 348, para. 40.
45 Cf. O.R., Doc. C(4), A / CONF.97 / C.1 / SR.1, p. 348, para. 45.
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/17/17 3:20 PM
Benjamin K. Leisinger, Some thoughts about Art. 39(2) CISG IHR 2/2006 81
Art. 39(2) CISG ex officio, i.e. even when the seller in the case
at hand does not rely on this provision.46
VII. Content of the notice of non-conformity
A substantial issue that regularly arises is the standard that the
notice has to meet as regards content.
Art. 39(2) CISG does not explicitly state what standard is to
be applied when deciding whether the content of any alleged
notice of non-conformity is sufficient. However, Art. 39(1)
CISG states that the buyer has to give notice to the seller
specifying the nature of the lack of conformity. This means that
the notice has to be sufficiently substantiated as to place the
seller in the position to know, in good faith, the substance of
the non-conformity and to enable him to take the necessary
steps to either cure the non-conformity or to prepare for legal
proceedings, etc.47 This standard also applies under Art. 39(2)
CISG. If the drafters of the Convention had not wanted the
standard under Art. 39(1) CISG to also apply under Art. 39(2)
CISG, they would have explicitly stated so. In any event, due to
the international character of the CISG, which is relevant
under Art. 7(1) CISG48 in interpreting Art. 39(2) CISG, the
standard applied under Art. 39(1) CISG is not a very strict one.
General statements of dissatisfaction, however, are not
sufficient.49
Some authors hold that, in this age of electronic commu-
nication, a seller could be expected to make inquiries of the
buyer after receiving a non-specific notice of lack of conformi-
ty, and that, in general, the buyer must therefore be permitted
to substantiate his notice immediately.50 While this is true and
reasonable in the setting of Art. 39(1) CISG, a slightly different
standard has to be applied under Art. 39(2) CISG. Here, unlike
under Art. 39(1) CISG, as there is no flexible period of time,
but rather a “precise and non-variable”51 period, there is a dan-
ger that a buyer may give an unsubstantiated notice simply to
prevent the period for relying on any non-conformity from
lapsing. Such a non-specific notice cannot, therefore, lead to
the result that the absolute time limit of two years is extended
in any way. This is also supported by the fact that Art. 39(2)
CISG states that the notice must be given “at the latest” within
two years.52 Furthermore, as the period under Art. 39(2) CISG
cannot be suspended or interrupted at all,53 it cannot be sus-
pended or interrupted by such an unspecified notice, either.
VIII Formal requirements
As under Art. 39(1) CISG, any notice under Art. 39(2) CISG
does not need to meet any formal requirements. It can even be
made orally, as long as the seller is able to understand it.54
However, due to the fact that the buyer has to prove that he
actually gave notice under Art. 39 CISG,55 it is wise to choose a
means of communication that allows reproduction and proof of
the date of the notice.
IX. Final remarks
As has been shown, Art. 39(2) CISG raises some interesting
questions. However, when using the tools of the CISG, espe-
cially Arts. 7(1) and 7(2) CISG, most of these questions can be
answered in a reasonable way. These tools make it possible to
answer the question if and when the period under Art. 39(2)
CISG is triggered if the goods never have been actually handed
over to the buyer – it is triggered by the hypothetical handing
over in case of the destruction of the goods and by the buyer’s
refusal in the case of rejection of the goods or documents. They
also provide for an answer when asking how the period under
Art. 39(2) CISG is calculated and what the content and form
of such notice has to be.
This again shows that the CISG is a flexible convention,
best suited for meeting the needs of legal certainty, flexibility
and reasonableness in international trade.
46 Cf. Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit. (footnote
5), Art. 39 para. 23; Brunner, UN-Kaufrecht – CISG, Bern 2004,
Art. 39 para.16; Schlechtriem, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht, 2nd
ed., Tbingen 2003, p.111, para.160.
47 See Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit. (footnote
5), Art. 39 para.6; Honnold, op. cit. (footnote 10), § 256; Landgericht
Saarbruecken (Germany), 26 March 1996, CISG-online No. 391. For an
overview of cases regarding the specificity of the notice under
Art. 39(1) CISG, see CISG-AC Opinion no 2, Examination of the
Goods and Notice of Non-Conformity – Articles 38 and 39, 7 June
2004, Rapporteur: Professor Eric Bergsten, Emeritus, Pace University
New York, online at: http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/docs/CISG-AC_
Op_no_2.pdf.
48 Art. 7(1) CISG states:
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade.
49 See OLG Oldenburg (Germany), 28 April 2000, CISG-online No. 683,
Bundesgericht (Switzerland), 13 November 2003, CISG-online No.
840.
50 See Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit. (footnote
5), Art. 39 para.7; Bernstein / Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG
in Europe – A Compact Guide to the 1980 United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Boston 1997, p. 92 et seq.;
Brunner, op. cit. (footnote 46), Art. 39 paras.6, 7; Honnold, op. cit.
(footnote 10), § 256.
51 See UNCITRAL Digest on the CISG, op. cit. (footnote 7), Art. 39
para. 23.
52 Several representatives in Vienna were even of the opinion that the
limit should be shortened to only one year. However, taking the needs of
developing countries into account, the drafters decided not to shorten
the period. See O.R., Doc. A(11), A / CN.9/100, p.55, para.61; O.R.,
Doc. B(1), A / 32/17, annex I, p. 39, para. 203 et seq.; O.R., Doc. C(2),
A / CONF.97/9, p.77.
53 Cf. Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit. (footnote
5), Art. 39 para. 23; Enderlein, in: Enderlein /Maskow / Strohbach,
op. cit. (footnote 41), Art. 40 para.6.
54 Cf. Salger, in: Witz / Salger / Lorenz, International Einheitliches Kauf-
recht, Heidelberg 2000, Art. 39 para.10; Oberster Gerichtshof (Aus-
tria), 15 October 1998, CISG-online No. 380.
55 See Schwenzer, in: Schlechtriem / Schwenzer (eds.), op. cit. (footnote
5), Art. 39 para. 38; Salger, in: Witz / Salger / Lorenz, op. cit. (footnote
54), Art. 39 para.7.
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